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Broad, Inflexible and Redundant?:  




I.  INTRODUCTION 
ections 75A- 75C of the Finance Act 2003 (‘the Sections’) were enacted with the intention of 
countering schemes that have the effect of reducing Stamp Duty Land Tax (‘SDLT’) liability.2 
These sections were subjected to criticism right from the start, with practitioners noting its 
exceptionally broad scope and some going so far as to call it ‘fundamentally deficient’ and ‘almost 
unworkable in practice’.3 The recent decisions of the First-Tier Tribunal in Project Blue Ltd v Revenue 
and Customs Commissioners4 (‘Project Blue FTT’) and its subsequent appeal to the Upper Tribunal in 
Project Blue Ltd v Revenue and Customs Commissioners5 (‘Project Blue UT’) have since provided some 
clarification about the interpretation of the scope of the Sections.  
This article will begin with a brief analysis of the Sections and the decisions at both courts in 
Project Blue, with a focus on the inherently broad scope of the Sections created by the language of the 
statute. It will then go on show that the initial framework that the Sections was intended to create 
relied heavily on the power of discretion by Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs (‘HMRC’) in 
deciding which cases the Sections should be applied to. As the courts in Project Blue have held that 
HMRC has no such discretion, it will be argued that the decision strains the other mechanisms which 
restrict the scope of the Sections. The law as it stands after Project Blue now seems indeed almost 
unworkable in practice.  
The article will focus on the three main flaws of the Sections, as elucidated from the 
interpretation of the court in Project Blue: 1) the lack of discretion for HMRC to determine the cases 
to apply the Section to; 2) their excessively broad scope; and 3) the lack of flexibility in determining the 
consideration paid for the land. The article will then concentrate on four potential solutions to the 
problem of the excessively broad scope of the Sections. It will be argued that the scope of the Sections 
could be narrowed by: 1) a greater exercise of the powers of the Treasury to widen the scope of 
exceptions;6 2) restoring the power of discretion to HMRC on when to apply the Sections (preferably 
by amending the statute based on the current General Anti-Avoidance Rule (‘GAAR’));7 3) refining 
the requisite connection test8 and basing it on whether the transaction is in substance one of the 
disposal and acquisition of land; or 4) accepting motive as a regulatory mechanism.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Trinity College, Oxford. I am very grateful to Dr Glen Loutzenhiser for all his insightful comments. I would 
also like to thank the editors of the Oxford University Undergraduate Law Journal for reviewing the article. All 
errors and omissions are my own.  
2 HM Revenue and Customs, ‘Section 75A Finance Act 2003’ 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140109143644/http:/www.hmrc.gov.uk/so/advice75a.htm accessed 1 
July 2015.   
3 Natalie Lee (ed), Revenue Law: Principles and Practice (27th edn, Bloomsbury Professional 2009) para 3.1. 
4 [2013] UKFTT 378 (TC). 
5 [2014] UKUT 564 (TCC). 
6 Project Blue (UT) (n 5). 
7 The GAAR is a broadly drafted provision that attempts to counter tax avoidance schemes that have ‘slipped 
through the net’ of specific anti-tax avoidance legislation. The current GAAR was enacted by Parliament through 
the Finance Act 2013, ss 206-215 and sch 43. 
8 Based on the interpretation of the words ‘in connection with’ in s 75A(1)(b) Finance Act 2003. 
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It is accepted that the language of the Sections and the current interpretation adopted in 
Project Blue does restrict the ability of the courts to interpret the Sections freely. However, it will be 
argued that though legislative changes would definitely be welcome for an Act which ‘drafting leaves 
much to be desired’,9 in the meanwhile, judicial solutions can be applied and the courts need not be 
forced to come to unjust and impractical outcomes. The four solutions proposed above represent a 
good mix of statutory and judicial measures.  
The need for a mini-GAAR in this context will then be questioned, looking at the present 
situation where we already have Disclosure of Tax Avoidance Schemes (‘DOTAS’) legislation10 and a 
broad GAAR. If the Sections are to be useful, they must be able to perform a function in addition to 
or better than the existing measures. It will be argued that the key to this lies in reforming the scope of 
application of the Sections. Of the four solutions proposed, it will be argued that the ‘requisite 
connection’ test11 is ultimately the best solution. This is because it can provide a more refined approach 
to determining the scope of the Sections that goes beyond what the GAAR can currently do.  
 
II.  THE INTRODUCTION OF GENERAL ANTI-AVOIDANCE RULES 
For as long as there has been the collection of tax, there have also been attempts to avoid the payment 
of tax. Despite the constant attempts of the tax authorities to brand tax avoidance as immoral,12 the 
constant intellectual battle between the tax authorities and the taxpayer is unlikely to cease anytime 
soon. As our tax laws have become increasingly sophisticated, the ingenuity of the taxpayer (or more 
realistically, his lawyers and accountants) has kept pace, producing more and more elaborate schemes 
to ‘optimise’ the amount of tax payable. Understandably, this has caused the tax authorities much 
consternation as they are forced to constantly review their policies, plugging loopholes and ensuring 
that enough revenue is collected. Tax avoidance is a particularly political issue at the moment and some 
view curbing it as an opportunity to unlock a potentially large source of much needed revenue.  
With taxpayers constantly testing the line between tax avoidance and tax planning (and a few 
bolder ones crossing over into tax evasion),13 the Government has instituted several policies intended to 
tilt the odds in their favour. Targeted (or Specific) Anti-Avoidance Rules (‘TAAR’) have been 
introduced to deal with loopholes and schemes in numerous areas of the law. DOTAS legislation has 
been implemented to provide HMRC with more information on potential tax avoidance schemes.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Project Blue (UT) (n 5) [132] (Nowlan J). 
10 The Finance Act 2004, ss 306-319 introduced a duty on those involved in implementing tax avoidance schemes 
to disclose details to HMRC. This was reviewed and tightened in FA 2007, FA 2008 and FA 2010. For more 
details on disclosure, see J. Tiley and G. Loutzenhiser, Revenue Law (7th edn, 2012) para 5.3.2 and Freedman 
[2004] BTR 332, 339-42. 
11 Based on a particular interpretation of the words ‘in connection with’ in s 75A(1)(b). 
12  The morality of tax avoidance is a controversial area. See J. Freedman, ‘Interpreting Tax Statutes: Tax 
Avoidance and the Intention of Parliament’ (2007) 123 LQR 53, where she considers Honoré’s argument from T. 
Honoré, ‘The Dependence of Morality on Law’ (1993) 13 O.J.L.S. 1. ‘[Honoré] argues that, whilst there is a 
moral obligation to pay taxes, this obligation is incomplete apart from law because the law has to fix the amount or 
rate of tax. He might have added that law has to fix the basis on which tax is payable.’ 
13 The terms used here are in common use though there is some ambiguity as to their exact meaning. They are 
helpfully explained in J. Tiley and G. Loutzenhiser, Revenue Law (7th edn, 2012) para 5.1. Tiley and Loutzenhiser 
distinguish Tax avoidance and tax evasion by explaining that in the former case, no liability to tax arises, while in 
the latter case, a charge arises but the tax cannot be collected. They define tax planning as ‘what all sensible people 
do in order to reduce their tax liabilities.’ Also see Freedman (n 12) at 70. 
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General Anti-Avoidance Rules (‘GAAR’) represent the latest attempt of a Government 
determined to regain control of the tax process and force businesses to scale down, if not eliminate, 
their tax avoidance efforts.14 GAARs involve a substantial conceptual departure from the measures 
taken by the Government in the past. Unlike TAARs, which attempt to pre-empt and stop existing or 
foreseeable schemes of tax avoidance, GAARs attempt to catch tax avoidance schemes which are not 
caught by TAARs, whether they were foreseeable at the point of the enactment of the GAAR or not.15 
The ability of the GAARs to do this lies in their very broad scope which reduces the ability of the 
taxpayer to structure a scheme that takes advantage of the limitations of statutory language caused by 
imperfect information. As GAARs have very broad scopes, there is a need for some other kind of 
mechanism to regulate this scope. A popular mechanism is to rely on the tax authority’s discretion on 
when to apply the GAAR.16  
While GAARs can be more effective at catching cases of tax avoidance, they are also 
controversial as, prima facie, they raise questions about certainty of legislation, the Rule of Law and the 
justifiability of the potential retroactive effects.17 A strong Rule of Law based criticism of GAARs 
would be that they hamper the ability of individuals to find out what the law is and to structure their 
affairs accordingly. These serious concerns hampered the smooth legislation and enactment of a 
GAAR in the United Kingdom. However, after much debate and a few false-starts, Parliament has 
since enacted a GAAR into law.18  
The history of the GAARs and the related anti-avoidance measures are important for a full 
understanding of the Sections, which were one of the first successful attempts of the Government in 
getting a GAAR into law (though on a small scale and not drafted in the best way). However, the 
Sections differ from the GAAR itself in that it does not seem to have an express provision for a test of 
‘reasonableness’, to be used when determining the scope of application of the anti-avoidance rule.  
With this understanding of the place of the Sections in the general scheme of things, two 
questions are raised: 1) if the Sections are a primitive (and unrefined) attempt at a GAAR, does this 
mean that we should revise or construe them in accordance with the final (refined) version of the 
GAAR?; and 2) if the Sections were enacted before the GAAR was passed, do they still serve a useful 
purpose now that SDLT is one of the taxes to which the GAAR applies?19 These questions will be 
answered in detail later in the article. For now, suffice it to say that the answer to the first question is, 
yes; and the answer to the second question is, yes, but only if we use them correctly.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 An interesting point raised by M. Thomas is that the GAAR does not have the effect of eliminating all tax 
avoidance schemes, but deals with ‘standard schemes’ and forces bespoke planning of tax avoidance. This has the 
effect of making it much harder, though not impossible, to avoid tax.  
See M. Thomas, ‘Section 75A 2003: the Death of SDLT Planning?’, GITC Review (Volume VI Number 2, June 
2007) 1.  
15  The UK GAAR was arguably designed only to target the most ‘abusive’ schemes. See J. Tiley and G. 
Loutzenhiser, Revenue Law (7th edn, 2012) para 5.52 and The Aaronson Report (Report of the GAAR Study 
Group, November 2011) 5.1. 
16 Noted that this is subject to some oversight. For example, in Canada, there is a GAAR committee made up of 
Revenue, Finance, and lawyers from the Department of Justice which makes the final decision as to whether to 
apply the GAAR. In the UK, there is the UK GAAR Panel oversight.  
17 The concerns regarding GAARs and its potential benefits are addressed in J Freedman, ‘Designing a General 
Anti-Abuse Rule: Striking a Balance’ (2014) IBFD Asia- Pacific Tax Bulletin 165. Freedman argues that such 
provisions are essential in a modern tax system. With the increased complexity of such systems, it would be 
impossible for specific legislation to catch every abuse.  
18 Finance Act 2013, ss 206-215 and sch 43. 
19 This is provided for in Finance Act 2013, s 206(3)(f). 
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III.  PROBLEMS WITH THE ACT AND ITS APPLICATION 
A.  SECTIONS 75A-75C OF THE FINANCE ACT 200320 
 
Sub-sections 75A(1) and (2) 
(1) This section applies where– 
(a) one person (V) disposes of a chargeable interest and another person (P) acquires 
either it or a chargeable interest deriving from it, 
(b) a number of transactions (including the disposal and acquisition) are involved in 
connection with the disposal and acquisition (‘the scheme transactions’), and 
(c) the sum of the amounts of stamp duty land tax payable in respect of the scheme 
transactions is less than the amount that would be payable on a notional land 
transaction effecting the acquisition of V's chargeable interest by P on its disposal by 
V. 
(2) In subsection (1) ‘transaction’ includes, in particular– 
(a) a non-land transaction 
Section 75A(1) lays out the scope and application of the anti-avoidance rule. There are three 
conditions which must be satisfied if the Sections are to be applied: 1) a disposal of land (or an interest 
deriving from it) by a person (V) and the acquisition of land by another person (P);21 2) a number of 
transactions involved in connection with the disposal and acquisitions (‘the scheme transactions’); and 
3) a lower amount of SDLT is payable than if there was a notional sale from V to P. Sub-section (2) 
clarifies that ‘transaction’ includes, inter alia, non-land transactions.  
The resulting effect is an extremely broad scope for the Sections. For any transaction where 
land is involved; where there are a number of connected transactions; and where less SDLT is payable 
than with a direct transfer; SDLT will be payable in full as if there was a direct transfer. This has the 
potential to cover almost any transaction with the slightest link to land which is conveyed through 
intermediary companies. The question then becomes whether it was possible that the Sections were 






20  The Sections were first introduced by the Stamp Duty Land Tax (Variation of the Finance Act 2003) 
Regulations 2006 (SI No. 3237) and a new version was enacted by s 71 Finance Act 2007. The Sections were thus 
drafted as subsidiary legislation and later enacted as primary legislation. 
21 It is noted that there was considerable discussion on identifying P and V in Project Blue at both the First-Tier 
Tribunals (‘FTT’) and Upper Tribunal (‘UT’) levels. The lack of clarity on this issue is certainly a problem in 
interpreting the Section. However, it will not be covered in detail here. For a more in-depth discussion on this 
point, see Patrick Cannon, ‘Project Blue’ (News Article, 20 January 2015) 
<http://www.patrickcannon.net/news/currentnews/article.cfm?id=81> accessed 1 July 2015.  
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Sub-sections 75A (4) and (5) 
(4) Where this section applies– 
(a) any of the scheme transactions which is a land transaction shall be disregarded for 
the purposes of this Part, but 
(b) there shall be a notional land transaction for the purposes of this Part effecting 
the acquisition of V's chargeable interest by P on its disposal by V. 
(5) The chargeable consideration on the notional transaction mentioned in subsections (1)(c) 
and (4)(b) is the largest amount (or aggregate amount)– 
(a) given by or on behalf of any one person by way of consideration for the scheme 
transactions, or 
(b) received by or on behalf of V by way of consideration for the scheme transactions. 
Sub-section (4) then provides for the effect of the anti-avoidance rule. If the conditions under sub-
section (1) are met, all the intermediate (or scheme) transactions will be disregarded under this head of 
tax and the full amount of SDLT payable on a direct  (notional) transfer from V to P will be payable 
instead. Sub-section (5) provides that the SDLT shall be computed based on the largest amount of 
consideration paid at any point of the scheme. 
 
Sub-sections 75C(1)-(10) 
Sub-sections 75C(1)–(10) qualify sub-section 75A(5), with  sub-section (5) in particular allowing for 
the ‘just and reasonable’ apportionment of the consideration paid between the various chargeable 
interests if there are more than one in the scheme transactions.  
Keeping in view sub-section 75A(5), however, It is noted that the Sections provide no power 
to the courts to make their own estimate of a fair quantum of the consideration paid on which to base 
the calculation of SDLT. It is simply to be calculated on the highest quantum of consideration paid in 
the scheme transactions. Sub-section 75C(5) allows for separation of land transactions (for each 
property) from the rest of the transaction, with SDLT being payable individually on each land 
transaction. This means that SDLT will not be blindly calculated on the full quantum of the 
consideration paid, which may include consideration given for non-land transfers. However, there is at 
least one type of situation where the strict application of the rule might lead to harsh consequences. 
This is where there are fluctuations in the price of the property as the transactions occur. Thus, SDLT 
would be calculated on the highest quantum of consideration given at any point of the scheme 
transactions, even if the market price of the property subsequently drops.  
If the intention behind the statute is merely to prevent tax avoidance, then there is no 
justification for making the parties base the quantum of consideration on the highest possible price of 
the property across all the scheme transactions. Not all land transactions go through multiple stages for 
tax avoidance reasons. Counsel for the Appellant in Project Blue raised some objections on this point, 
with the strongest objection being the argument that the subsequent purchaser may be wholly unaware 
of the consideration paid in the earlier part of the scheme transactions and end up being subject to a 
OXFORD UNIVERSITY!
UNDERGRADUATE LAW JOURNAL 
! ! !
101 
much larger tax bill than initially expected.22 In Project Blue itself, the transaction had to be structured 
in such a way so as to comply with the rules of Islamic Financing.23 The impression one gets from 
reading subsection 75A(5) is that it was drafted to prevent the parties from transacting at an 
undervalue and then arguing that the tax should be calculated based on that lower value. If that was 
indeed the intention of Parliament (which fits well with the idea of the Sections being a mini-GAAR), 
then the literal wording of subsection 75A(5) seems to be unduly inflexible. It would arguably be fairer 
to allow the court the discretion to fix a single point when the transfer should have taken place, and 
base the calculation of SDLT on the consideration paid at that point.24  
 
B.  THE FACTS OF PROJECT BLUE 25 
For the purposes of the article, the facts of Project Blue can be quickly summarised. It will soon be 
apparent that the case has much broader implications. Most of the points in the judgment which are 
being considered here were expressed in a general manner and it does not seem that they were 
particularly dependent on the facts of the case. Project Blue Limited (‘PBL’) bought land from the 
Ministry of Defence (‘MOD’) for £959m but had to structure the transaction such that the land had to 
be sold to a financial institution (‘MAR’) at £1.25b and leased back to PBL with options providing for 
the eventual transfer of the property back to PBL.26 PBL argued that the structuring was done in order 
to comply with the Sharia (Islamic) law of finance and it was claimed (though not established in court) 
that there was no intention of tax avoidance.27 HMRC then sought to apply s 75A and claim SDLT 
based on the full consideration of £1.25b.28 PBL contested that assessment and claimed that under s 
45(3) Finance Act 2003 or s 71A Finance Act 2003, sub-sale relief applied and they were not liable to 
pay any SDLT.29 
 
C.  PROJECT BLUE30 AT THE FIRST TIER TRIBUNAL 
The First Tier Tribunal interpreted the Sections with a rather literal approach, largely coming to the 
same conclusions as were listed above in the analysis of the Sections. As noted, this interpretation of 
the Sections by the courts produces two problems: 1) an excessively broad scope; and 2) a lack of 
flexibility in determining the consideration paid for the land. Setting aside the issues of the 
identification of ‘P’ and ‘V’ in the transactions and the impact of the Sections on reliefs, which are 
beyond the scope of this article;31 the most important issues which the decision of the First Tier 
Tribunal dealt with relate to 1) the discretion of HMRC to decide which cases to apply the Sections 
to; and 2) the interpretation of the terms ‘in connection with’ in s 75A(1)(b). The court also dealt with 
the issue of ‘motive’ and its relevance to the applicability of the Sections. These issues will be 
considered in detail subsequently. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 Project Blue (FTT) (n 4) [121].  
23 ibid [123]. Noted that this was not actually proved in the case itself.  
24 There is one more notable concern with the way that the Sections focus on a notional transfer and disregard the 
other parts of the transaction. This has to do with the applicability of reliefs and the difficulty of determining 
whether and which reliefs are relevant to the scheme transactions. This point is covered by M. Thomas, ‘Section 
75A 2003: the Death of SDLT Planning?’ GITC Review (Volume VI Number 2, June 2007) 72- 75. 
25 Referring to the case both at the FTT and the UT levels. Project Blue (FTT) (n 4), Project Blue (UT) (n 5). 
26 Project Blue (FTT) (n 4) [2]-[15].  
27 ibid [123]. 
28 ibid [18]-[20]. 
29 ibid [16]. 
30 ibid. 
31 For more in-depth coverage of these points, see (n 21) and (n 24). 
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D.  PROJECT BLUE32 AT THE UPPER TRIBUNAL 
The focus of the court at the Upper Tribunal level was mainly on the issues of identifying ‘P’ and ‘V’33 
and over the quantum of consideration on which to calculate the SDLT on (Nowlan J holding that the 
sum was £1.25b and Morgan J, with the casting vote, holding that the sum was £959m). We briefly 
note that Nowlan J felt constrained by what he termed to be the ‘numerous strict and mechanical rules 
… not to be capable of purposive interpretation’.34 We have previously noted the problems with the 
lack of power of the judges to be flexible in determining the relevant quantum of consideration. 
Nowlan J’s dissatisfaction of this point reflects the concerns of the judiciary with this issue, though it is 
conceded that Nowlan J did not actually advocate for changes to be made to this rule. It is noted that 
as Nowlan J was a member of the Aaronson Committee designing the GAAR he might be said to be 
particularly well informed on these points.  
Apart from those issues, the judgment of the Upper Tribunal did not go much further than 
affirming the decision of the First-Tier Tribunal. However, the court did give extensive reasons for its 
rejection of the relevance of motive and actual tax avoidance as factors to be considered in determining 
the applicability of the Sections.35 The issue of motive will be considered in detail subsequently. 
 
E.  THE FRAMEWORK INTENDED BY PARLIAMENT 
A brief look at the wording of the Sections, coupled with an understanding of the background of the 
legislation and how GAARs work in general suggests that the general idea of the anti-avoidance 
framework here was one of a ‘catch-all with exceptions’. This would change the default position from 
the tax authority having to find a specific provision to cover the situation in question. Instead, HMRC 
would simply impose the relevant tax on any transaction which met very basic criteria. The onus would 
then be on the taxpayer to find the relevant exception to prove why he should not be taxed. This 
understanding of the framework is supported by various features of the Sections, including the very 
broad scope of the ‘trigger requirements’ in s 75A(1) and the fact that the Sections expressly include 
some specific exceptions to the application of the general rule. The court in Project Blue FTT argued 
that sub-sections 75C (11) and (12) were an indication that Parliament intended the scope of the 
Sections to be broad, providing for the eventuality that the provisions might ‘overshoot’.36 Finally, 
counsel for the Respondent in Project Blue FTT argued that the exclusion of commercial transactions 
by sub-section 75A(7) was indicative of the broad scope of the provisions.37 
It is thus argued that Parliament intended for a ‘catch-all with exceptions’ approach. The 
most obvious exception can be found in sub-sections 75A(7), 75C (11) and (12). However, it cannot 
be the case that Parliament wished to provide only these three exceptions. The scope of sub-section 
75A(7) is very specific and limited. A quick look at sub-sections 75C (11) and (12) tells us why they 
could not possibly have been intended to be adequate exceptions.  Sub-section (11) provides that ‘the 
Treasury may by order provide for section 75A not to apply in specified circumstances’. Sub-section 
(12) provides that ‘an order under subsection (11) may include incidental, consequential or transitional 
provision and may make provision with retrospective effect.’  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 Project Blue (UT) (n 5). 
33 As defined in s 75A(1)(a). Not covered in this article. See (n 21). 
34 Project Blue (UT) (n 5) [168]. 
35 ibid [50]-[58]. 
36 ibid [225]. 
37 ibid [144]. 
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Thus, the Treasury has the power to retrospectively declare that certain transactions would 
not attract tax liability. However, the Treasury cannot reasonably be expected to go through the 
numerous different kinds of transactions that take place daily and pick out the ones which it believes 
should be exempt from SDLT. It is not practical for the Treasury to exercise this power as the main 
mechanism for limiting the scope of the Sections.  
If the three sub-sections mentioned above were not meant to be the main regulators of the 
scope of the Sections, then it is likely that Parliament intended for some other regulators.38 It is argued 
that the two best candidates for this position of ‘main regulator’ are 1) the discretion of HMRC; and 2) 
a ‘requisite connection’ test introduced by the terms ‘in connection with’ in s 75A(1)(b). Parliament 
may indeed have intended for these two regulators to work concurrently.  
The literal interpretation of the scope of the Sections is broad enough to encompass all 
effective transfers of land. We must consider the possibility that the Sections were indeed intended to 
levy SDLT on all effective transfers of land, regardless of whether the transfer of land was merely 
incidental to the full transaction. This would mean that a sale of a manufacturing company, for 
instance, would attract SDLT liability on the transfer of the fee simple of the factory, even though the 
transaction was in substance one of a sale of the whole business and not one where the transfer of land 
was a major feature of the transaction.  
It is inconceivable that the Sections were intended to have this effect.  There was no mention 
of any desire to implement such a radical departure from existing practice when the Sections were 
being considered.39 Furthermore, Guidance from HMRC suggests that the Sections were enacted with 
the intention of countering schemes that have the effect of reducing SDLT liability.40 Therefore, there 
must clearly be some mechanism intended to control the scope of application of the Sections, and this 
mechanism cannot simply catch any transaction with some connection to the transfer of land. 
 
IV.  THE VARIOUS SOLUTIONS 
A. SOLUTION (1): HAVE THE TREASURY EXPAND THE EXCEPTIONS 
UNDER SUB-SECTIONS 75C(11) AND (12) 
Sub-section 75C 
(11) The Treasury may by order provide for section 75A not to apply in specified 
circumstances. 
(12) An order under subsection (11) may include incidental, consequential or transitional 
provision 
and may make provision with retrospective effect. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38 It is noted that the word ‘regulators’ in this case refers to factors which control the scope of application of the 
Sections. Parliament may have simply envisioned a narrower scope of application and not consciously considered 
some of these factors. The ‘requisite connection test’ in particular may not have been actively considered by 
Parliament but represents an attempt to give effect to Parliament’s general intention.  
39 Hansard records no debate regarding this point, which would be highly unusual if the proposed statute was 
intended to have the effect of widely expanding the incidence of SDLT. 
40 HM Revenue and Customs (n 2).  
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There is the possibility that Parliament intended that the Treasury should use sub-sections (11) and 
(12) to regulate the scope of the Sections generally by issuing subsidiary legislation as to the ‘specified 
circumstances’. If this was indeed the intention, it has not been done as HMRC’s current ‘Whitelist’ of 
transactions to which it will not seek to apply the test41 is mere advice and not subsidiary legislation, 
and thus lacks the force of law. It is argued that the complete lack of exercise of this power by the 
Treasury suggests that the power under sub-sections 75C (11) and (12) was meant to be exercised as a 
‘back-up’, in case the main measures for determining the scope of the Sections missed specific 
instances which should not attract tax liability.  
This does not mean that the sub-sections cannot be actively used to control the scope of the 
Sections now. If the Treasury creates exceptions on a case by case basis, then the use of the sub-s 
75C(11) and (12) powers would indeed be very limited. If the exceptions are drafted to describe classes 
of transactions, then it may be of more use. On the whole, however, it seems impractical to expect the 
Treasury to constantly draft new exceptions to the rule whenever different kinds of transactions arise. 
This is especially so as there are so many potentially different kinds of transactions. 
 
B.  SOLUTION (2): RESTORE THE POWER OF DISCRETION TO HRMC  
ON WHERE TO APPLY THE SECTIONS 
The First-Tier Tribunal in Project Blue considered the legal arguments regarding the existence of the 
power of discretion and eventually concluded that HMRC did not have that power of discretion. The 
court considered the Guidance Note42 issued by HMRC and its declaration that ‘HMRC will not seek 
to apply 75A where it considers transactions have already been taxed appropriately’.43 It held it to be at 
odds with the general obligation of HMRC to collect a tax imposed by Parliament.44 The court cited 
the case of Vestey v IRC,45 where HMRC had claimed the right to select which one of the beneficiaries 
of a discretionary trust to tax and to apportion the tax between several beneficiaries according to any 
method they thought fit.46 HMRC was denied this discretion, with Lord Wilberforce laying down the 
principles of tax assessment.47  
The first key point of Lord Wilberforce’s judgment is his decision that ‘A proposition that 
whether a subject is to be taxed or not, or that, if he is, the amount of his liability is to be decided (even 
though within a limit) by an administrative body, represents a radical departure from constitutional 
principle’.48 He then went on to require express enactment by Parliament before the courts would give 
effect to such a proposition.49 The second key point of Lord Wilberforce’s judgment is his reason for 
objecting to such a proposition, which was that it ‘would be taxation by self-asserted administrative 
discretion and not by law… one should be taxed by law, and not be untaxed by concession’.50 From 
these points, the court in Project Blue (FTT) went on to conclude that ‘unless it clearly provides 
otherwise, section 75A should be construed as not giving HMRC a discretion whether to apply the 
statute nor as conferring on HMRC a discretion either whom to tax or as to the amount of tax to be 
levied’.51 
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43 Project Blue (FTT) (n 4) [218]. 
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46 Project Blue (FTT) (n 4) [220]. 
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From a perspective of strict judicial precedent, Vestey is a decision of the House of Lords that 
has not been overruled. It might be distinguished on its specific facts, but the rather broadly worded 
judgment of Lord Wilberforce makes this difficult. A bolder (and, in my opinion, better) argument 
would simply be to distinguish Vestey on the grounds that it does not apply where it potentially 
conflicts with GAARs. Vestey was decided in 1979 and there have been considerable developments in 
the field of tax law since then.  The most important development in this regard is the introduction of 
the GAAR and the accompanying changes in the general approach to tax assessment.  
By their nature, GAARs have to rely on a certain degree of administrative discretion in 
practice. The scope of the power to tax is drafted broadly, with the onus on the tax authority to 
exercise discretion whether to question the transaction. The courts are then relied upon to give an 
authoritative judgment on the issue if the matter is contested. In the vast majority of cases, however, 
the courts are not involved and the discretion whether to tax a particular transaction is in effect made 
by the tax authority. As there has not yet been any GAAR litigation in the UK at the current moment, 
this is based on GAAR litigation in other jurisdictions (e.g. Canada, Australia and New Zealand) and 
on the framework outlined by the Aaronson Report.52  
One can see that there is something inherently objectionable with allowing the tax authority 
untrammelled discretion to ‘over-tax’. However, HMRC deals with a very large volume of tax cases 
and arguably should be much better placed than the courts to distinguish between those cases which 
Parliament would wish to impose SDLT on and those which Parliament considers not within the 
ambit of the tax. In light of this, allowing them some discretion may not be objectionable. 
Furthermore, there is always the possibility of review of their decisions.53 If they ‘under-tax’ in a few 
cases, that may be an acceptable cost of efficient administration of the tax system and not sufficient 
cause for removing their discretion.  
That HMRC should have a discretionary power as to the cases to which the Sections apply is 
wholly consistent with the position that they have been taking to date; namely that they view s 75A as 
an anti-avoidance provision applying only where there is avoidance of tax and that they will not seek to 
apply it where they consider that transactions have already been taxed appropriately.54 The idea is 
further supported by an argument from the law of statutory interpretation: that ‘Official statements by 
government departments are important because Acts are supervised by a government department 
which may be assumed to know what the legislative intention was. Their interpretation of the Act, as 
inferred from their official statements, is likely to coincide with the intended interpretation of the Act 
as passed by Parliament’.55The fact that HMRC consistently affirmed that they had the discretion to 
determine the kinds of cases to apply s 75A to is suggestive that this was indeed part of Parliament’s 
framework.  
The idea is also compatible with the concept of institutional competence. Instead of 
attempting to draft ever more complex legislation which is unlikely to cover all the eventualities, it may 
be better to draft the legislation broadly and then let the experts decide which cases to apply the 
legislation to. In this case, the best experts would be HMRC, who undoubtedly have the most 
experience in distinguishing between genuine cases of tax avoidance and innocent cases. 
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52 The Aaronson Report (n 15). 
53  Applications for review have been brought by third parties before, even if the taxpayer and HMRC are 
comfortable with the arrangement to ‘under-tax’. See R v Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex p National Federation of 
Self-employed and Small Businesses Ltd [1982] AC 617, [1981] STC 260. For more recent cases, see R (UK Uncut 
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54 HM Revenue and Customs (n 2). 
55 Oliver Jones, Bennion on Statutory Interpretation (6th edn, LexisNexis Butterworths 2013) 231.  
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Following Vestey and Project Blue (FTT) strictly would mean that HMRC would have to 
apply the Sections to every single case where the conditions of s 75A(1) are met unless clear exceptions 
can be found. The taxpayers would then have to appeal each of these individual cases to the courts to 
determine if they have any tax liability. Given the broad scope of s 75A(1), this would be completely 
impractical and almost impossible to enforce.    
Returning to our previous point of the framework intended by Parliament, it is most unlikely 
that Parliament considered that the Sections would be applied in this way. There are strong arguments 
for the proposition that Parliament intended for the discretion of HMRC to be one of the ‘main 
regulators’ of the scope of the Sections, and now that Project Blue (FTT) has denied HMRC this 
power, this is likely to create a significant strain on the other regulating mechanisms. The most 
straightforward way to solve this issue would be for Parliament to pass an amendment, updating the 
Sections to include a provision similar to that found in s 207(1) Finance Act 2013 (The GAAR). 
Failing that, the Court of Appeal could recognise that times have changed since Vestey and affirm the 
discretion given to HMRC when Project Blue comes before it again.56 If these two measures are not 
taken, the only alternative would be to place more reliance on the other regulating mechanisms of the 
scope of the Sections. 
It is worth mentioning that this measure of allowing HMRC considerable discretion was not 
favoured by the GAAR Committee in the Aaronson Report. The committee argued that the 
‘determination of a reasonable and just result is an issue which should be justiciable before the Tax 
Tribunal, and not left to HMRC’s discretion’.57 However, it is noted that this recommendation was 
made together with a proposal that the courts should take into account guidance from HMRC 
approved by the GAAR panel. 58 For the GAAR, since guidance from HMRC must be taken into 
account, there is no need to allow them any further discretion.  This may not be the case for the 
Sections, where no such provision applies. While some of the objections of the GAAR Committee 
would admittedly still apply to this proposed solution as well, it is worth considering giving more 
discretion to HMRC in the absence of any other provision involving them in the framework.  
 
C.  SOLUTION (3): THE ‘REQUSITE CONNECTION’ TEST 
Section 75A(1)(b) requires that ‘a number of transactions (including the disposal and acquisition) are 
involved in connection with the disposal and acquisition (‘the scheme transactions’)’ in order for the 
transactions to fall within the scope of s 75A. The First-Tier Tribunal recognised that s 75A(1)(b) was 
crucial to the application of the Sections, being one of the three main requirements in s 75A(1) and 
governing the applications of sub-sections s 75A(1)(c), (4) and (5).59  
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56 Projected date: 23 March 2015. 
57 The Aaronson Report (n 15) 5.35- 5.40. 
58 Eventually included in the statute at Finance Act 2013, s 211. 
59 Project Blue (FTT) (n 4) [247]. 
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After analysing the existing case law,60 the court held that the meaning of ‘in connection with’ 
required that there be a sufficient linkage between the transactions and the disposal and acquisition of 
the land. In the court’s words, ‘a transaction which is part of a series of transactions will not be 
“involved” with other transactions simply because it is part of a series or sequence of successive 
conveyancing transactions. The linkage must be more than merely being a party in a chain of 
transactions and the test must be more than a “but for” test’.61 The court went on to hold that in this 
case, the sub-sale and the lease were ‘involved in connection with’ the disposal of the property, but 
provided no further guidance on the application of the proposed test.  
It is argued that the proposed test by the courts is far too broad. As noted earlier, there is a 
high probability that Parliament intended for the test imposed to determine the requisite level of 
connection to be a main regulator of the scope of the Sections. In that case, the courts’ ‘more than but 
for’ test is too vague and has a high likelihood of being practically completely redundant: a sieve 
without any mesh. Regardless of whether the use of the ‘requisite connection’ mechanism as a way to 
control the scope of the sections was expressly considered by Parliament, it provides an excellent way to 
control the scope of the otherwise excessively broad ss 75A- 75C, provided we make some necessary 
changes.   
One way which imposing a test on the requisite level of connection can help to regulate the 
scope of the Sections is to conceive ‘in connection with’ as a test for whether the transaction is 
substantively one of transferring the land, or whether the transfer of the land is merely incidental to the 
rest of the transaction. Returning to our example of the sale of a manufacturing company, the transfer 
of the factory building would indeed technically be part of the whole transaction, but be insufficiently 
connected to the other parts of the transaction because the transfer of the factory would only be 
incidental to the true purpose of the transaction, which would be the sale of the manufacturing 
company. Consequently, SDLT need not be paid on the transfer of the factory, since there was never a 
direct transfer, and s 75A would not operate to impose SDLT on a notional transfer since there are no 
‘number of transactions’ which are sufficiently connected to the transfer of the factory (thus, s 
75A(1)(b) is not satisfied). This would achieve an outcome which would not significantly extend the 
current scope of SDLT. This would not be achieved if we were to apply Project Blue in determining the 
applicability of the Sections.  
The test thus becomes one of looking at the substance of the transaction and determining if 
SDLT should be imposed because it is a ‘land transaction’ or whether it really is another kind of 
transaction where the transfer of land just happens to take place. This is consistent with the general 
approach to tax law to look at the substance rather than the form of the transactions.62 
To remove any sort of assessment as to the substance of the transaction and impose a blanket 
application of SDLT on any transaction with the slightest link to land is not beyond the powers of 
Parliament. But that would be most unlikely in the context in which the Sections were enacted and in 
any case, caution ought to be exercised before we decide that Parliament intended to vastly expand the 
current scope of SDLT through what was thought by HMRC to be a mere anti-avoidance provision.  
There is a need for a test of the substantive nature of the transaction and it is currently not 
apparent that any other part of the Sections provides such a test. In light of this, it is argued that 
Parliament probably intended for s 75A(1)(b) to fulfil this function. Even if this were not the case, 
there is a strong argument that it should now be used as such a test.  
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61 ibid [250]. 
62 Well established in case law and famously noted in the case of WT Ramsay Ltd v IRC [1982] AC 300 (HL).  
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D.  SOLUTION (4): USE MOTIVE AS A REGULATORY MECHANISM 
It is noted that the ‘requisite connection’ test discussed above could technically have ‘motive’ instead of, 
or in addition to ‘whether the transaction is in substance, one involving land’ as the factor determining 
if the requisite level of connection has been met. It is argued that the substance of the transaction is a 
better candidate for the ‘requisite connection’ test as there is a more pressing need for a test that 
screens out transactions with only incidental connections to land. If motive is to be an additional factor 
in the ‘requisite connection’ test, then the reasoning of the courts in Project Blue rejecting this, as 
analysed below must be addressed. It will ultimately be argued that the reasoning of the courts on 
excluding motive as a relevant factor is unpersuasive and that motive should be considered relevant, 
whether as a standalone test or as part of the ‘requisite connection’ test. The former option is preferable 
as it serves to enhance clarity regarding the tests. This is important as there may be up to four potential 
tests involved.  
The reasons given by the Upper Tribunal can largely be divided into two main arguments: 1) 
there is a lack of any express provision allowing the courts to consider motive (‘the omission 
argument’); and 2) the Sections define ‘avoidance’ themselves, making it impossible to imply a 
requirement that the transaction must have the purpose of tax avoidance in the conventional sense (‘the 
definition argument’). It is noted that the court did consider the implications of rejecting motive as a 
regulatory mechanism but considered itself bound by the wording of the statute.63  
The omission argument notes that ‘the enacting words of section 75A do not contain any 
provision which limits its scope to a case where there is a relevant purpose of tax avoidance’ and that 
there are other provisions (including those within the Finance Act 2003 itself) which clearly do impose 
a requirement that there be such a purpose.64 As a matter of statutory interpretation, the court 
considered this omission to be intentional and reflective of the intentions of Parliament that showing 
that tax avoidance was a relevant purpose was not of utmost importance when applying the Sections.  
Given that there are examples elsewhere of the express inclusion of the requirement of motive 
in the same Act, the court has a strong case for arguing that proof of motive should be irrelevant. As 
argued above by Jones,65 at least one canon of statutory interpretation permits such a conclusion and it 
is not an unreasonable inference on the facts. However, it might also be reasonable to argue that the 
Sections were enacted solely for the purpose of preventing anti-avoidance schemes and that the courts 
in Project Blue have become unnecessarily bogged down in the technicalities of the statutory language. 
In that case, it would be a very positive thing for the Court of Appeal to take a highly purposive 
approach to interpretation and give effect to the statute as Parliament intended.66 
The definition argument notes the numerous references in the headings or side-notes of the 
Sections to the words ‘anti-avoidance’. It acknowledges that it may be possible to argue that a 
purposive approach to construction should be taken and that the scope of the Sections should cover 
only cases of ‘avoidance’. However, the core of the definition argument is that section 75A already 
defines what is meant by a case of ‘avoidance’ itself. The court held that ‘section 75A explains that a 
case which comes within section 75A(1)(c) is a case of “avoidance” and the sections are to operate to 
counter that avoidance. It is therefore neither necessary nor appropriate to read more into the side 
notes and to hold that the side notes are to be taken to refer to an unstated requirement that there be a 
purpose of tax avoidance’.67 
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This argument is a more persuasive one. However, even if it is inappropriate to infer from the 
headings and side-notes in the Sections that actual tax avoidance is required, motive will still be 
relevant if it can be successfully argued that Parliament actually intended it to be a requirement and 
merely inadvertently omitted it in the drafting process. Of course, regardless of the intentions of 
Parliament when the Sections were drafted, Parliament can establish the requirement of motive now 
through a statutory amendment. This would bring the Sections in line with how the GAAR is 
currently functioning and it is argued that Parliament should consider this.  
 
V.  MOVING FORWARD: MECHANISMS AND SOLUTIONS 
A. OTHER MECHANISMS 
When the Sections were first enacted, anti-avoidance measures were largely limited to TAARs and 
other specific forms of legislation. However, the tax authorities have continually developed more 
sophisticated measures and have successfully managed to get legislation establishing the GAAR and 
the DOTAS passed. With the GAAR covering (some) loopholes in the TAARs and the DOTAS 
managing the information asymmetry between the tax authorities and the taxpayers, one cannot help 
but wonder if the Sections are actually adding anything useful to the system, or are merely redundant. 
Given the complexity, excessively broad scope and problems with the Sections, if they do not have any 
useful functions, it might be better for them to be altogether abolished.  
There are at least three ways to move forward with the Sections: 1) change the Sections to 
mirror the GAAR; 2) abolish the Sections and rely on the GAAR; or 3) keep the Sections, but modify 
them such that they add something to the tax framework. The third option is preferable if it is at all 
possible to do so. The strength of a mini-GAAR is that it is more specific and hence a sharper tool for 
distinguishing between innocent cases and cases of tax avoidance. In the context of SDLT and land 
transactions, what distinguishes the Sections from the GAAR is its potential sensitivity to when it 
would be reasonable to impose SDLT. It is argued that the criteria for distinguishing the cases would 
be the nature of the transaction and whether it is in substance, one of the disposal and acquisition of 
land. Thus, I would argue that the way to make the Sections play a useful function would be to focus 
on the requisite connection test and interpret the words ‘in connection with’ in s 75A(1)(b) in the 
manner proposed above.  
 
B.  UNDERSTANDING THE SECTIONS IN LIGHT 
OF THE CURRENT GAAR FRAMEWORK 
The Aaronson Report and the subsequent enactment of the GAAR after the Sections help us to shed 
some light on the framework required for a GAAR to work effectively. The Aaronson Report makes it 
clear that the GAAR is meant to be aimed at ‘obvious’ and the most ‘egregious’ cases only. 
Furthermore, there are other safeguards in the legislation to protect taxpayers. In Appendix I of the 
Aaronson Report, the GAAR Committee lists four main safeguards, including the referral of potential 
counteraction to the Advisory Panel (Safeguard 4).68 HMRC sought approval from the GAAR panel 
before issuing guidance on the application of the GAAR. The statute itself provides that such 
approved guidance must be taken into account by the court.69 This seems to be the model that 
Parliament intended GAARs to be based on. 
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There are indeed two ways to look at this issue. One could argue that since the GAAR 
expressly provides for such a framework and the Sections do not, Parliament did not intend that the 
framework should be applicable to the Sections as well. However, looking at the context in which the 
Sections are enacted, it is possible to advance an alternative argument. It is possible that Parliament 
intended for the Sections, as a mini-GAAR, to function as the GAAR was eventually enacted. 
However, as the idea of a GAAR was still being introduced in the United Kingdom at that time, the 
Sections were not drafted well enough to reflect Parliament’s intention and failed to accurately capture 
this. Based on this argument, the intention of Parliament would be that all the safeguards to protect 
the taxpayer would be applicable to cases covered the Sections and not just limited to those cases 
caught by the GAAR.  
It is worth explaining this argument in detail. It is not being proposed that the Parliamentary 
intention has changed and that the courts should give effect to the new intention. Rather, it is argued 
that the Parliamentary intention all along was to have a functioning and effective GAAR mechanism 
and what has changed is how the statute has been drafted to achieve that same outcome.  Therefore, 
the mere omission of express safeguards in the Sections should not be taken to mean that Parliament 
has intended that such safeguards should not apply in these cases. 
 
C.  SUMMARY OF THE POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
We have thus far discussed four potential solutions to the broad scope of the Sections: 1) have the 
Treasury expand the exceptions under sub-s 75C(11) and (12); 2) restore the power of discretion to 
HMRC on when to apply the Sections; 3) refine the requisite connection test and base it on whether 
the transaction is in substance, one of the disposal and acquisition of land; and 4) use motive as a 
regulatory mechanism. The relative merits of each potential solution have been discussed above, but it 
is noted that the relative ease of application of the solutions differ significantly. Solution (1) is the 
easiest to implement as it requires absolutely no change to the law; in statute or as established by 
Project Blue. All that is required is that the Treasury take a more proactive role in exercising its powers 
under ss 75C(11) and (12). There would be a slight advantage in terms of the speed with which this 
can be implemented. It is noted that the advantage would probably not be particularly significant as 
Parliament passes at least one Finance Bill every year that could potentially implement this solution. It 
is unlikely that the powers would be enough to solve the problems of the Sections in practical terms. It 
is argued that ss 75C(11) and (12) were intended as ‘back-up’ provisions and trying to go beyond that 
would place excessive strain on the system.  
Solutions (2) and (4) have currently been rejected by the courts in Project Blue and it would be 
more difficult to implement them. Judicial or legislative intervention would be required, with the 
former requiring the provision of reasons for departing from the existing legal position. Going with 
these two methods has a bonus in that they result in the clarification of the Sections as anti-avoidance 
measures and nothing else. It remains to be seen if the Court of Appeal in the pending appeal of 
Project Blue will take either of these approaches.70 These approaches would probably be sufficient to 
solve the problems that we currently have with the Sections, though it is noted that solution (2) would 
be better executed by Parliament than the courts.71 The model provisions can already be found in the 
GAAR and Parliament would simply have to enact an amendment to introduce the ‘reasonableness’ 
requirement as in the GAAR to the Sections.  
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Solution (3) technically does not go against the current state of the law. What it does require 
is a shift in mindset in how the Sections are to be construed. As noted above, solution (3) has the 
distinct benefit of being able to perform a unique function of determining which transactions are 
substantially land transactions and therefore should be subject to SDLT in the conventional 
application of that head of tax. It is argued that solution (3), with its ability to properly identify the 
kind of transactions which would have been subjected to SDLT if not for the scheme transactions, is 
the best solution to adopt. While solutions (3) and (4) are distinct, they can also be applied together. 
Solution (3) can be adjusted to include considerations of motive if it is decided by the courts that it 
should be relevant to the application of the Sections. Otherwise, it works perfectly well when 
considerations of motive are irrelevant. 
Finally, it is noted that a combination of the proposed solutions may be used. Indeed, whilst it 
is argued that the ‘requisite connection’ test is the best solution, each solution focuses on different 
(though overlapping) factors and different situations might call for the use of different judicial tools. In 
some cases, more than one tool might be required. Much depends on the circumstances of each case.  
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Sections were subjected to criticism when enacted72 and indeed subsequent cases have shown that 
their application is procedurally difficult and practically almost unworkable. In the rapidly developing 
field of tax law, statutes must be understood in both the context in which they were enacted and the 
subsequent developments which have taken place since. The introduction of a GAAR has significantly 
changed the playing field and we must be prepared for even greater and more rapid changes as the 
GAAR is implemented.  
The main problem of the excessively broad scope of the Sections arose because of a relatively 
literal and inflexible interpretation of the Sections, coupled with bad drafting and insufficient 
information on the intention behind their enactment. This article has sought to show that while the 
judges naturally felt constrained by the wording of the Sections, there was and still is considerable 
room for a broader construction which may be able to avoid the major problems currently faced. The 
ideal solution here would simply be for Parliament to intervene and replace the Sections with a much 
better drafted revised version. However, in the interim, the courts still do have room to manoeuvre and 
are not necessarily forced into making impractical and unjust decisions. Ultimately, tax law is 
constantly evolving and Parliament will have to keep pace with the developments by constantly 
updating its statutes. The GAAR may have evened the fight between the tax authorities and the 
taxpayer briefly but we can be sure that human ingenuity will soon require more sophisticated anti-
avoidance measures.  
The enactment of the GAAR also introduces a new dimension to the rationale for the 
TAARs or mini-GAARs. There is absolutely no point in having mirror provisions that do the same 
thing as the GAAR. If the TAARs are to be useful, they will have be drafted such that they strike a 
balance between being specific enough to distinguish between the innocent cases and the tax avoidance 
cases; and being broad enough to catch cleverly designed avoidance schemes. With the GAAR in 
place, it is argued that the focus should now be more on the ‘specific’ side of things, for the GAAR’s 
function is to deal with the ‘broad’ side of things. Attempting to perfectly balance both functions may 
lead to a situation where the legislation achieves nothing and may even be counterproductive. The 
GAAR has not rendered TAARs or min-GAARs redundant, but they need to find their own niche in 
order to serve useful functions in the overall legal framework.  
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